During the financial crisis in 2007-8, the quoted spread for the average S&P 1500 firm increased by 50%, while the systematic liquidity risk increased by 34%. We find that the trading of a firm's equity by institutional investors increased the firms' quoted spreads, and led to a higher liquidity commonality during the crisis. Sell-side herding contributed strongly to both effects. Our results are robust to different specifications and measures, and are not compatible with reverse causality inferences. They are consistent with theoretical and anecdotal evidence regarding the role of herding during a crisis. 
Introduction
During the 2007-8 financial crisis, the average quoted spread for the S&P 1500 firms was 50% higher than that for the three years preceding the crisis. In the same period, 42% of the cross-sectional variation in the quoted spreads can be explained by common market moves, whereas only 7% can be attributed to a common factor in 2004-6. This paper investigates the effect of institutional investors' (IIs) trading on the liquidity characteristics of S&P 1500 stock during the financial crisis, and finds that the larger the number of institutional shareholders holding a firm's equity, the larger the share's quoted spread and the greater its liquidity risk. We find strong evidence that institutions' sell-side herding is a key factor in these phenomena. In 2007, IIs held 80% of the S&P 1500 equity and accounted for the majority of the trading volume in the markets. Given the size of II participation in the economy, II trading behavior has a large impact on liquidity and trading costs and can easily induce market-wide systemic liquidity risk. So this paper not only provides important policy implications but also some empirical support to theoretical models of extreme liquidity (e.g. Huang and Wang, 2009; Kyle and Xiong, 2001) , in particular regarding the role of (IIs') trading activity in exacerbating the liquidity drain-out during the recent financial crisis.
Recent theoretical papers indicate the role of II trading in affecting liquidity during a market crisis. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) suggest that adverse shocks to the assets posted as collateral may induce sell pressure by IIs, due to funding constraints, and therefore trigger market-wide liquidity shortages. Similarly, Garleanu and Pedersen (2007) show that tighter risk management by IIs during market downturns reduces liquidity provision. Huang and Wang (2009) provide a theoretical model in which idiosyncratic shocks render investors more risk averse, exacerbating the selling needs of potential sellers and dampening the demand from potential buyers. This asymmetry leads to order imbalances in the form of excess supply and large decreases in price. Finally, Kyle and Xiong (2001) argue that increased correlation in II trading strategies, that is, II herding, could lead to excess order imbalances, and hence greater trading costs, if IIs liquidate their positions in risky assets at the same time. Demsetz (1968) and Benston and Hagerman (1974) argue that the number of investors holding a firm's equity is a proxy for the number of transactions, that is, trading activity, since it is positively related to the number of potential buyers and sellers of the stock. Several empirical papers illustrate that the breadth of share ownership results in higher market 3 liquidity (Amihud et al. 1999; Grullon et al. 2004; Lipson and Mortal, 2007) . This is either because higher trading activity reduces trading costs and therefore increases market liquidity, or because highly liquid shares attract more investors to trade the firms' equity in the first place. We find this result carried through to institutions' holdings; the larger the proportion of shares held by institutions, the smaller is the quoted spread.
1 However, after controlling for institutions' shareholdings, the number of IIs holding shares has the opposite effect. We argue that this is due to the firm's vulnerability to institutional herding as the number of IIs increases (Nofsinger and Sias, 1999; Sias, 2004; Zhou and Lai, 2009) . The contrasting effects between II holdings and number of IIs are prevalent throughout our findings. II herding, or correlated trading activity among IIs in general, results in order imbalances and increased trading costs. As mentioned above, this effect is expected to be more pronounced during periods of crisis in the capital markets, when there are strong selling needs due to increased risk aversion (Huang and Wang, 2009 ) and the need to liquidate positions in risky assets (Kyle and Xiong, 2001 ). Indeed, we find strong evidence that it is the number of IIs, that is, II count, and not II holdings, that drives liquidity commonality during the crisis period.
Institutions are more likely to herd than individuals as they can respond faster, they are subject to similar informational and regulatory environments, and their managers face heightened moral hazard problems, which makes them more reactive to bad news. Sias (2004) lists five explanations for institutions' herding: informational cascade, investigative herding, reputational herding, fads and characteristic herding.
2 Recent theoretical models suggest other reasons for IIs' herding behavior; for example, IIs are subject to the same funding constraints (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009 ) and risk regulations (Garleanu and Pedersen, 2007) . All or some of these explanations could contribute to the herding results presented here.
Our summary statistics bear two simple facts for the S&P 1500 sample as a whole: (i) average II holdings and count went up during the crisis; (ii) there was a switch from buy 1
In the literature, the larger II holdings are expected to lead to better monitoring and governance and hence reduce the spread in trading costs. There could be a nonlinear pattern when so-called "free rider", or adverse selection, problems emerge as the institutional presence becomes too large.
2
Informational cascades happen when IIs infer information from each other's trades when information is noisy. Investigative herding occurs because IIs follow the same signals. Reputational herding refers to the situation where IIs choose to share the blame rather than taking independent decisions. Fads, or following the trend, refers to IIs following the same investment strategies because they are considered novel. Characteristic herding refers to IIs being attracted to securities with the same set of characteristics. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the sources of II herding. Instead, we document its existence and demonstrate its impact on market liquidity.
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herding during the pre-crisis period to sell herding during the crisis. During the crisis, sellside herding significantly increased the quoted spreads and the cross-sectional commonality of spread movements, as measured by regression R-squares and betas. We argue that this Given that they only account for about 10% of the holdings of S&P 1500 firms, their trading activity has very little impact on the liquidity commonality before and during the crisis.
We recognize that alternative explanations, based on spurious relations and omitted variables, might explain our results. Therefore, we run a battery of tests to try to alleviate such concerns. We include in our model specifications several market and accounting-based control variables, which the literature has identified as important determinants of trading cost and liquidity risk. In addition, we use industry and firm fixed effect specifications to account for omitted variables. In all our models, we cluster the standard errors at the firm level to control for time-series dependence, and add year dummies to capture the effect of crosssectional dependence. We also run regressions based on the changes in the variables, instead of their levels. These are less likely to capture spurious relations; they confirm our results.
Finally, we highlight why both the II count and herding results do not support alternative explanations based on reverse causality.
An alternative explanation for our results could be related to the composition of ownership and, in particular, the lack of individual investors in firms with a high number of IIs. Amihud et al. (1999) argue that the higher the number of individual investors holding a firm's equity, the higher the noise trading, and hence the higher the market liquidity. In addition, they find that a reduction in the proportion of individual investors in a firm's ownership structure is associated with an increase in adverse selection costs, since the market makers have to deal with fewer uninformed investors. However, in our sampled firms, the number of IIs is positively, significantly correlated with both the number of individual investors and their proportional representation. Our results do not appear to be driven by the lack of individual investors in high II count firms.
In this paper, we make two important contributions to the literature on the impact IIs have on firm market liquidity. Firstly, we show that it is important to recognize the difference between the relative impacts of the number of and holdings of institutional shareholders.
There has been substantial literature on shareholdings but little research focus on the number Kyle and Xiong (2001) , and highlight the importance of supply side sources of illiquidity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe our data sources, variable definitions and provide some descriptive statistics. In section 3, we report our results. Section 4 provides our concluding remarks.
Data

A. Sample Firms
We identify all the constituents of the S&P 1500 index, that is, the union of S&P 400, We use CUSIP as a unique firm identifier that allows us to merge the information from different databases. 3 We delete from our sample firms that have multiple CUSIPs or 3
The CUSIP (Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures) identifier is a unique code for companies and issues and is used extensively across different financial databases. CUSIP has three types: 6-digit, 8-digit and 9-digit. CUSIP 6 is a company identifier. CUSIP 8 is a stock/security identifier. CUSIP 9 has an extra check digit, which allows checking for consistency across the CUSIP formats. 
B. Variable Definitions
In this section we describe the variables used in this study. To run our analyses, we need proxies for institutional trading, ownership and herding, proxies for a stock's market liquidity and liquidity commonality, and control variables identified in prior studies as important determinants of liquidity and commonality.
II variables and stock liquidity
The extensive literature on institutional investment highlights the importance of the effect of institutional ownership on a firm's market liquidity (e.g., Dennis and Weston, 2001; Sarin et al. 2000; Agarwal, 2007 We follow the literature on institutional herding and define it as the ratio of number of buyers to overall number of active institutions (Lakonishok et al. 1992; Sias, 2004; Chung and Zhang, 2011) . For each quarter, using the 13f data, we count the number of institutions that increased (decreased) their holdings in a given firm and classify them as buyers (sellers).
We then calculate the ratio of buyers to active (buyers and sellers) institutions. Our herding measure is the average ratio across the four quarters in every fiscal year. Lakonishok et al. (1992) subtracts from the herding measure the cross-sectional mean, that is, the expected proportion of buyers in the market. We do not follow this practice, given our empirical setting and in particular our interest in comparing the crisis with the pre-crisis period. 6 In the results section, we also describe two variations to the herding measure that we calculate to test the robustness of our results.
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II count is positively and significantly correlated with share dollar volume, both in the crisis and the precrisis period. In contrast, the correlation between II holdings and dollar volume is negative and insignificant for all periods.
5 http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/, accessed in May 2010.
6
As we report in the results section, the institutions' herding behavior changes substantially during the crisis. Therefore, herding measures that are adjusted for the cross-sectional average could result in drawing the wrong conclusion, i.e., that there is no difference between the herding measure in the crisis and pre-crisis periods.
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As a proxy for a stock's market liquidity, we use the observed quoted spread. Goyenko et al. (2009) 
where Ask t and Bid t are, respectively, the closing ask and bid prices on day t in year y, and D y is the total number of trading days in year y. This is what is known as round trip spread. We did also calculate annualized sell-side and buy-side spreads but the correlations between the three spread measures were found to be very high. Hence, we kept only the round trip spread.
In order to calculate liquidity commonality, we follow Chordia et al. (2000) and Brockman et al. (2009) and run the following time-series regressions using monthly observations for each firm in our sample:
where ∆ denotes the proportional change in the variable between successive months. The information on the market (M) is calculated using the equal-weighted average (for Spread or Return) for all firms in our sample except firm f. Firm return volatility is calculated for the month m using daily information. We run these time-series regressions separately for the 
Control Variables
We use several control variables identified in the literature as determinants of stock market liquidity. It has been widely documented that the level of the stock price is related to a firm's market liquidity, since it controls for price discreteness and also acts as a proxy for firm risk, that is, low prices are associated with higher risk (Stoll, 2000) . We estimate the annual stock price using the average of the daily closing prices. We also control for the volatility of daily returns, using an annualized figure of the standard deviation of the daily returns over a year. High volatility translates to high firm risk and high inventory costs for traders. At the same time, it is associated with a high level of information asymmetry between company insiders and outsiders, as well as between investors with different information sets (the adverse selection argument). For all these reasons, we expect to observe a negative relationship between return volatility and liquidity. High trading volume is associated with decreases in inventory risk (Stoll, 1978a,b; Hameed et al. 2010 ) and should therefore lead to higher liquidity, that is, lower spreads. Prior firm market performance can affect the firm's return volatility and therefore liquidity (Hameed et al. 2010 ), thus it is important to control for it. The daily return is averaged over the year and annualized.
In addition to these market-based control variables that are frequently used in the market liquidity literature, we also examine the impact of several accounting-related firm characteristics. Firm size is expected to be positively correlated with liquidity. Larger firms are more visible and more carefully scrutinized by both investors and analysts. An increase in information disclosure will render prices more efficient and this benefit is greater for large firms if they can attract IIs (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) . Hence, the shares of larger firms are expected to be more liquid. We control for firm size by including in our models the value of total assets, retrieved from Compustat.
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Stock liquidity also interacts with capital raising behavior. Companies with liquid stocks prefer raising equity over raising debt (Lipson and Mortal, 2009 ). Lesmond et al. (2008) find that leverage-increasing activity increases bid-ask spreads and vice versa.
Amihud and Mendelson (2008) explain that, the higher the company's leverage, the more sensitive is its value of equity to information asymmetry and adverse selection. This explains why leverage reduces stock liquidity, producing wider bid-ask spreads and higher price 8 We use the book value of assets, and not the market value of equity, as a proxy for firm size, to reduce the cross-correlation in our multivariate models. Using market capitalization does not alter our results.
impact costs. We measure financial leverage as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, as reported in Compustat. Stock liquidity depends, among other things, on the shareholder base; the larger the base, the more liquid is the stock (see Amihud et al. 1999; Grullon et al. 2004; Lipson and Mortal, 2007) . We capture the breadth of ownership by measuring the number of shareholders, as reported in the firms' annual reports in Compustat.
Another important parameter, which affects decision making within a firm and has a direct impact on firm performance, is shareholder rights. Managers who are protected from shareholders' action against them are expected to be less efficient and less transparent.
Bebchuk et al. (2009) construct an E-index (Entrenchment Index), which is based on six shareholder rights provisions. The higher the level of the E-index, the higher is the level of managerial entrenchment. Bebchuk et al. find that the E-index is better related to firm valuation than the G-index (which is an index based on 24 provisions, developed by Gompers et al. 2003) . Managerial entrenchment is expected to have a negative relationship to market liquidity, since entrenchment leads to higher trading costs for shares if investors are deterred by the entrenchment provisions. 9 Finally, a key factor in the theory of liquidity through inventory control is the information asymmetry between the market maker and the investors, and the resulting adverse selection problems that face the market maker when he trades with an informed investor. One external influence that reduces information asymmetry is the role played by the security analysts. The larger is the number of analysts following the company, that is, the greater the analyst coverage, the more liquid is the company's stock (see Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1995; Irvine, 2003) . We measure analyst coverage using the number of next-year forecasts (FY1) issued by analysts per year. The number of year one earnings forecasts (F1NE) is obtained from the I/B/E/S history file through Datastream. We retrieve the information on the Entrenchment Index (E-Index) from Lucian Bebchuk's website: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml, accessed in May, 2010.
C. Descriptive Statistics
As illustrated in panel A, consistent with our expectations, during the 2007-8 financial crisis the average quoted spread increases to 0.235%, from 0.157% in the pre-crisis period.
Moreover, this increase is due to an upward shift in the whole distribution, as can be seen from the significant increases of all quartiles. This is also accompanied by an increase in the standard deviation, indicating more widespread differences in the cross section, compared to the pre-crisis period. A similar pattern applies to the liquidity commonality, as measured by R 2 , with the mean value increasing from 6.9% to 41.5% and a similar magnitude of increase applying to all quartiles. The Liquidity Beta has a different pattern, with a drastic decrease in range and cross-sectional standard deviation. This reflects a strong convergence of firms' liquidity systematic risk towards the significantly higher average level recorded for the crisis period, compared to the pre-crisis period.
Panel B, provides details relating to institutional investment. Our summary statistics on II holdings are similar to those reported in the relevant literature. On average, institutions hold 76% of our sampled firms' equity. The largest holders are independent advisors (46%), followed by banks (14%) and insurance firms (3.7%). In terms of investment style, QIX trading institutions have the largest holdings (48.1%), followed by TRA IIs (16.9%).
Institutions classified as dedicated to a firm (DED) hold, on average, only 10%. The II count information reveals interesting details about the relative "power" of each II type within the average firm. The average holdings per institution are 0.3% (76% divided by 243 institutions -the average number of institutional shareholders in each firm) but this average holding varies across II types and investment styles. The average public pension fund holds 6.6% of a firm's equity, which is almost twice the average holdings of banks (3.5%). The average independent advisor holds close to the cross-sectional average (0.34%). The same pattern applies to the investment style classifications: the average DED investor holds significantly more equity than his QIX and TRA counterparts (1.7% compared to 0.3% and 0.2%, respectively).
The average firm in our sample is large, which is the result of our decision to study S&P 1500 firms. As reported in panel C, its stock price is $35 and the book value of assets is just above $20 billion. Over the studied period, the average stock return and return volatility are 2.9% and 39% respectively. The low return is a consequence of the boom and bust of the U.S. financial markets during our time-series (see panel D Wilcoxon rank-sum test reveals that, for most of our variables, we can reject the hypothesis that the sub-sample populations are drawn from the same distributions. These results on II holdings and count reveal the following interesting trends: (i) IIs on average are net buyers during the crisis; (ii) the sellers reduce their positions but do not divest themselves completely of their shares in the average S&P 1500 firm; (iii) the buyers not only cover the positions of the sellers but also buy out some individual investors, leading to an increase in the net II holdings; (iv) there are new IIs entering the U.S. market during the crisis.
Results
A. II Trading and Market Liquidity
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Our sample covers 3,349 (3,097) unique institutions during crisis (pre-crisis). Thus, the reported results in this paper are not driven by a wave of defaults, M&As or a divestment by institutions of their shares in the U.S. equity markets.
12
In order to reduce the impact of outliers we take the natural logarithm of the following variables that have skewed distributions: stock dollar volume, stock price, assets and number of shareholders. We also take the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of return volatility, instead of its level, to avoid multicollinearity issues. Indeed, a variance inflation factor (VIF) analysis for all of our model specifications reveals no significant problems, after these transformations.
13 Falkenstein (1996) states that IIs seek liquidity. The significance of II holdings on the right hand side of a regression explaining liquidity could therefore be due to an endogeneity bias. Agarwal (2007) performs a test of causality to investigate whether II ownership causes liquidity or if, instead, the relation is due to IIs seeking to invest in liquid stocks. He argues that the former holds.
14 heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Clustering the errors at the firm level allows us to control for time-series dependence. We present separately the results for the crisis and pre-crisis periods as well as those with and without the accountingbased control variables described in Section 2.
The proxy for institutional trading, II count, is positive and significant in all specifications. II trading increases the quoted spread in both the pre-crisis and crisis periods. This is consistent with our conjecture that the nature of II trading behavior increases trading costs. Later on in our analysis, in Table 7 , we provide direct evidence of this and also illustrate that it is sell-side herding that has the main effect on trading costs. Consistent with
Agarwal (2007), we also find that II holdings decrease the spread.
14, 15
All the market-based control variables are highly significant and have the predicted signs, that is, stock returns and volatility are positively associated with spread, whereas stock dollar volume and stock price are negatively associated with it. In contrast, none of the accounting-based control variables appear to be significantly related to spread. Still, we keep them in the subsequent analyses since, in several specifications, some of these controls appear to be marginally significant and increase the overall R 2 . Finally, we note the differences in the levels of the coefficients between specifications covering the same subperiod. Unreported analysis, using step-wise regressions, reveals that the introduction of the E-index variable reduces the sample size by 232 observations and accounts for most of the drop in the sizes of the II count and holdings coefficients. Further investigation shows that 79% of the missing observations in the E-index come from non-S&P 500 firms. Thus, we conclude that the changes in the coefficients are a manifestation of a firm size effect.
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The correlation between II count and II holdings is low, 2.2%. This result is interesting since it highlights substantial cross-sectional variation in the average holdings of individual IIs. More importantly, though, it shows that the result on the effect of II trading on spread is not driven by multicollinearity. We also perform our analysis excluding II holdings and the positive, significant relation remains (untabulated result). Following Agarwal (2007), one could also argue that II count acts as proxy for the squared II holdings; the pairwise correlation though between these two variables is only -4% in our sample.
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The literature reports ambiguous results on the effect of II holdings on spread. For instance, Dennis and Weston (2001) document a negative relation between the percentage of shares held by IIs and the log of the spread; their study is constructed in the same manner as ours. Sarin et al. (2000) , on the other hand, find a non-significant relation between holdings and spread. Agarwal (2007) argues that the relation between spread and institutional holdings should be U-shaped. This relation arises from a tradeoff between IIs increasing the spread due to adverse selection and decreasing it due to the information efficiency brought about by informed trading. Differences in the estimation methods, sample periods, and data sources used in these studies may explain some of the differences between the various empirical findings. Indeed, a cursory examination of Agarwal's sample, which mainly covers the eighties and nineties, reveals significant differences, e.g., he reports average II holdings of 36%, which is less than half of that of our sample (i.e., 76%). Still, we re-run our analyses including the squared II holdings and II count to capture non-linearity and our results remain unchanged.
We then investigate whether the positive relationship between institutional trading and spread is sensitive to the II type and investment style. We run a series of alternative model specifications to further examine the robustness of the relationship between II trading and stock market liquidity. Table 4 reports two of them.
Instead of examining the levels, we look at the annual changes in all of the variables.
Regressions based on variable changes are typically less likely to capture spurious relationships. In models 2 and 4, we also add the lagged change in the spread. This allows us to reduce autocorrelation in the residuals, caused by any non-stationarity in the time-series of spreads. Our results remain unchanged. Finally, we also run panel data regressions using firm fixed effects (untabulated results). The coefficient of II trading remains positive and highly significant (at the 1% level) in all specifications. II holdings remain negatively related to spread, but they are highly significant (at the 1% level) only for the pre-crisis period (significance is at the 10% level during the crisis). We note that running firm fixed effects models when the time-series of the panel is short could introduce more bias into the coefficients compared to the OLS models. We therefore re-run our panel data regressions for the full sample period, using an indicator (crisis dummy) variable for the crisis period. The results remain unchanged. Finally, we interact all the independent variables with the crisis dummy to capture marginal effects. Consistent with the above results, the marginal and base effects of II trading on spread, as captured by II count, are positive and highly significant. We conclude that II trading is negatively related to stock market liquidity.
Scholes (2000) argues that, during a crisis, market participants first sell the most liquid stocks in their portfolios. Similarly, Anand et al. (2010) report that IIs tilt their selling activity towards less liquidity-sensitive stocks during a crisis. These findings imply that our results cannot be driven by reverse causality.
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B. II Trading and Liquidity Commonality
We now turn our attention to the effect of II trading on liquidity commonality during the recent crisis. So far, the literature on liquidity commonality has identified firm size and can also induce liquidity commonality. Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) show that commonality in liquidity is related to periods of increased information asymmetry. Consistent with the prior analysis, we run OLS regressions and include industry and year fixed effects.
We also control for firm size using the book value of the firm's total assets. We cluster the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors at the firm level. We run our analyses both for the systematic (beta) and overall (R 2 ) liquidity risk.
16 Table 5 reports the results for the crisis period. We do not present the results for the pre-crisis period, essentially because the parameter estimates on II trading are largely insignificant. In panel A, we first use the overall II count and holdings and then separate them by II type. In line with our prediction, II trading is positively and significantly associated with both the liquidity beta and R 2 . In contrast, there is no significant association between liquidity commonality and the level of institutional shareholdings. These results corroborate the findings of Koch et al. (2010) on the impact of mutual fund trading (in our classification included in the IA group) on liquidity commonality. However, they also highlight the significant impact of the trading activities of other IIs, such as BNK and INS, during a crisis.
We repeat the analysis in panel B but now splitting by II investment style. The trading by QIX and TRA institutions is positively related to liquidity commonality. This result is robust for both measures of commonality. In contrast, trading by DED investors appears to have a very marginal effect (either insignificant or significant at the 10% level). We argue that this result is a manifestation of the herding behavior of IIs, which is expected to be more pronounced for QIX and TRA investors. DED investors are, by definition, buy-and-hold investors, who engage with a firm for the long-term; they are not expected to have similar herding behavior (to other institutions) during a crisis. In the next section, we provide direct evidence in favor of this conjecture.
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Using scatter plots we identify liquidity risk and II count values that could be considered as outliers. We run several sensitivity tests using different cut-off points for excluding observations. Our results are not driven by extreme values.
For completeness, we also report the results relating to the effect of institutional holdings on commonality split by investment style. The results are either weak (for example, only one of the two specifications for QIX and DED investors is significant) or contradictory (QIX holdings appear to have a marginally positive relationship with liquidity beta but TRA and DED holdings are negatively associated with beta). We note that their joint effect is not significantly different than zero, as shown in panel A.
C. II Herding
In this section we illustrate that II herding is the reason behind the positive effect of institutional trading on trading costs and liquidity commonality during crises. We first present summary statistics for our herding measure and then report our results on the relationship between II herding, trading costs and commonality. Panel B presents the correlation coefficients across types/styles for the herding measure. The correlations are all higher in the pre-crisis period than in the crisis period. This indicates some asymmetry between buy-side and sell-side herding behavior, that is, IIs buy together in good times but sell differently during crises. The IA group has the most highly correlated trading pattern, both within the group and with other groups. UFE's trading pattern has the least in common with those of other II types.
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The average values indicate a similar trend in most cases but report less buy-side herding behavior in the pre-crisis period. This discrepancy between the mean and median values in the pre-crisis period is driven by a significant number of sellers (clustering at the left tail of the distribution).
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In this paper, we use the quarterly 13f filings of S&P 1500 firms to determine changes in II ownership. This results in us not capturing all the net trades during the quarter, as well as short positions. These weaknesses in our data collection should bias our tests against finding significant results. Despite this, our herding measure clearly captures sell-side herding behavior among IIs during the crisis. Table 6 , panel A) and therefore do not affect the firm's trading costs. In addition, their average holdings are low, compared to QIX and TRA IIs, therefore any sell-side trading by them during the crisis has little effect on the order imbalances, and hence little effect on the trading costs. This result further confirms that our results are not driven by some confounding effect on the increased trading costs during the crisis. Table 8 presents our regression results on the effect of II herding on liquidity commonality. The coefficients for overall II herding are negative and significant for both measures of liquidity commonality. This indicates that sell-side herding increases commonality. During the pre-crisis period the relation between II herding and commonality is not significant (untabulated result). In contrast to the effect on spread, only strong sell-side herding affects liquidity risk. This could also explain the finding of Watanabe and Watanabe (2008) that high liquidity risk states of the economy are short-lived and characterized by heavy trading. We re-run the analysis by institutional type; the results are broadly insensitive to type (only UFE herding is not significant). IA and PPS have the coefficients with the highest statistical significance. We argue that herding is affected more by the investment style of the institutions than their type. We do not expect the herding activity of dedicated, buyand-hold, investors (DED) to have the same effect on liquidity commonality as that of TRA and QIX investors. In Table 6 , panel B, we observe that DED herding during the crisis has lower correlation coefficients than the other two investment styles, indicating a lower
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The negative relation between II herding and spread exists even in the pre-crisis period, though the impact of sell-side herding on trading costs is smaller (untabulated). This is reasonable given the prevalence of buy-side herding between 2004 and 2006. convergence of investment behavior among DED investors, than among the other two styles of investor.
In Table 9 we test this proposition directly. We run separate regressions by II investment style and find a negative, significant effect of herding only for QIX and TRA investors. The herding activity of DED investors does not affect liquidity commonality. The strongly negative coefficients for QIX and TRA IIs confirm that it is sell-side herding that increased liquidity commonality during the recent crisis.
In order to test the robustness of our results, in panel B, we follow Sias (2004) Voronkova and Bohl (2003) . The coefficients for overall herding remain negative and significant but are weaker, further indicating that the II count is more important than holdings in driving liquidity risk.
We run three additional analyses, in order to further strengthen our inferences (untabulated). First, if our conjectures regarding the role of II count are correct, one would expect a greater impact of sell-side herding on liquidity in firms with a greater number of IIs.
In order to test this, we create a dummy variable which takes the value one (zero) for any firms with above (below) median number of IIs during the crisis. We re-run the analyses of Tables 7 and 8 but now also include an interaction term of the II count dummy and II herding, as well as the uninteracted variables. This interaction term, which captures the marginal effect of II herding on liquidity in firms with high II count, is negative and highly significant in all regressions. Thus, we confirm that the impact of sell-side herding on increasing illiquidity, i.e., higher spread and liquidity risk, is more pronounced in high II count firms. Second, firms with blockholders have lower free float, therefore the impact of sell-side herding on liquidity is expected to be greater in these firms. We classify firms into 20
For each variable, both dependent and independent, we subtract the cross-sectional average and then divide by the cross-sectional standard deviation.
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Dollar herding is the ratio of the dollar value of shares bought to the dollar value of all shares transacted (bought and sold) over the period.
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two groups, that is, with or without a blockholder(s). We use, in separate analyses, indicator variables based on the holdings of the largest shareholder and the largest five shareholders.
The median blockholder has around 9% of the equity of the firm during the crisis. The median holdings of the five largest shareholders are 30% during the same period. Therefore, our indicator variables take the value one for values above 9% and 30% respectively, and zero otherwise. Following the analysis above, we interact the indicator variables with II herding to capture marginal effects. The marginal effect of II herding on spreads and spread commonality is larger in the presence of blockholders (highly economically and statistically significant). Third, Tables 7 and 8 test a linear relation between II herding and liquidity. But our predictions are based on sell-side herding only. In order to isolate the effect of sell-side herding we create two new variables: a sell-side herding dummy which takes the value of one when II herding is lower or equal to 0.5, zero otherwise; a Degree of Imbalance (DOI) variable, which is calculated as the absolute value of the difference of II herding from 0.5.
DOI captures the extent of herding imbalance in a firm. We re-run the analyses in Tables 7   and 8 , also including the interaction of DOI with the sell-side herding dummy, as well as the uninteracted terms. The coefficient of the interaction term is positive significant thus confirming that the greater the herding imbalance caused by sell-side herding the higher the spread and liquidity commonality.
Our results collectively indicate a significant role for sell-side II herding in increasing a firm's trading costs and liquidity risk. They confirm the speculation by Chordia et al.
(2000) that liquidity in commonality could be due to institutional herding (p. 14), and provide direct evidence to support the conjecture of Koch et al. (2010) that correlated trading increases liquidity commonality. They also extend Koch et al. by showing the impact of II herding on a firm's quoted spread, as well as demonstrating the prevalence of these phenomena across different II types during a crisis. Finally, they highlight the important differences between II investment styles, confirming that, in this setting, it is more important to investigate IIs with differing investment styles than IIs that are subject to different fiduciary standards.
Conclusions
This paper investigates the role of institutional investor trading in escalating market illiquidity during the recent financial crisis. We measure the intensity, scale and flow of In particular, prior theoretical literature predicts the existence of increased selling activity by IIs during a crisis. The rationale is that, during a market downturn, IIs face high selling needs, due to increased funding constraints (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009), high risk aversion (Huang and Wang, 2009) , tight risk management (Garleanu and Pedersen, 2007) , or convergence trading while offloading risky assets (Kyle and Xiong, 2001) . A common prediction is that these pressures lead to excess order imbalances and inventory costs, hence greater illiquidity. In this paper, we provide evidence that IIs did indeed increase their selling activity substantially during the financial crisis. More importantly, they did so in a coordinated manner, leading to higher sell-side herding. This sell-side trading activity led to an increase in firms' trading costs and liquidity risk during the crisis. We do not investigate which of the above reasons drives our results. Instead, we argue that, during a crisis, all of them could play a significant role in raising the selling needs of IIs.
Our results have important policy implications. In light of the prominent role of institutional investment in the U.S. capital markets and, in particular, the trading volume they generate, market participants should study more closely the impact of II trading strategies in generating systemic failures in the markets. The recent prevalence of high frequency, algorithmic, trading, driven by IIs, can only contribute to supply-side sources of illiquidity. Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
This table reports summary statistics for our sample firms. Panel A presents statistics for firm market liquidity in the crisis and pre-crisis periods and compares the averages. Quoted Spread is the annualized proportional spread, based on daily closing bid-ask prices. We follow the specification in Chordia et al. (2000) and run the following time-series regressions, using monthly observations for each firm in our sample to calculate the Liquidity Adj. R 2 and Liquidity Beta: ∆Spread , = α + β ∆Spread , + β ∆Spread , + β ∆Spread , + δ Return , + δ Return , + δ Return , + δ ∆Volatility , + ε , where ∆ denotes the proportional change in the variable between successive months. The information on the market (M) is calculated using the equal-weighted average (of Spread or Return) for all firms in our sample except firm f. Firm return volatility is calculated for the month m using daily information. We run these timeseries regressions separately for years 2004-2006 (pre-crisis) and 2007-2008 (crisis) . We define Liquidity Beta as the contemporaneous coefficient of the changes in the market portfolio spread (i.e., β 1 ). Panel B presents the statistics for institutional investment in our sampled firms. II holdings is the ratio of the number of shares held by IIs to the total shares outstanding. II count is the number of IIs holding a firm's shares. We follow Bushee (2001) and Liquidity Beta. All variables are defined as in Table 1 . Industry and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. p-values are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. In Panel A all regressions are run using the levels of the variables. In Panel B, we run standardized regressions, as in Sias (2004) , where all variables are transformed to have zero mean and unit variance, i.e., we subtract the crosssectional average and then divide by the cross-sectional standard deviation. 
